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Summary findings
Commander and Tolstopiatenko explain why in the former  in addition moonlight or get involved in the informal
Soviet  Union (FSU)  - especially  Russia  - unemployment  economy.
has remained low and employment in state and privatized  Why has this happened? Privatization has so far failed
firms has remained high, while at the same time the  to keep firms from behaving as if they have important
informal or unofficial  economy has grown swiftly.  social responsibilities. Managers may have more
They trace this development to a combination of  discretion in decisionmaking, but seem to be reluctant to
factors, including the control regime of state and  fire workers.
privatized firms, the nature of worker compensation, and  This reluctance reflects various pressures, including
the nature of subsidies or financial supports that firms  insider coalitions and pressure from local and federal
continue to receive.  governments to limit the flow to unemployment. One
Firms have remained the primary site for social  factor may be the need to keep workers cooperative and
protection. Subsidies for social benefits have effectively  possibly to repel outsider interest. And in the FSU, many
been a subsidy to employment and have promoted the  firms continue to operate  under soft budget constraints,
workers'  continuing attachment to these firms. Partly  so they are under less pressure to reduce employment
because the subsidies still flow and partly because of the  levels than firms in Eastern and Central Europe.
firms' internal control  structure, firms have held back on  Commander and Tolstopiatenko  show that under
shedding labor.  certain conditions if the subsidy to insider-dominated
Firms typically work at low capacity. Instead of laying  firms disappears, those firms will scale down
workers off, they significantly cut hours and wages,  employment and the provision of benefits. In a firm with
sometimes through wage arrears. The share of worker  two divisions - one that produces and one that provides
compensation that is nonmonetary has grown during the  benefits - the dominant (producing) division will tend
transition, and is significant. So workers search for  to close down the benefits-providing division if the firm
additional sources of income. They keep their jobs, but  assumes a simple majority-decision rule.
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One regularity  in the transition  has been a continuing  divergence  in the amount  of
unemployment  that has been  generated  in East and Central Europe  relative  to the states of
the  former Soviet Union. Table  1  shows that  using  registrations data  by  1995
unemployment  in the former  region  exceeded 10 percent of the labour force. By contrast,
unemployment  in the FSU was below 2 percent.  This discrepancy  is sometimes  attributed
to measurement  problems,  as also the latter's relatively late start in the transition.  Neither
provides a wholly convincing  explanation. Indeed, where labour force survey data are
available, as is the case for Russia, unemployment  rates still remain low relative to East
and Central Europe, as can be seen in Table 1.  Mis-measurement  of unemployment
cannot account  for the gap. And while it is true that many of the states of the FSU have
moved  slowly on structural  reforms,  including  privatisation,  even where  this has not been
true -- and Russia is the obvious case in point -- unemployment  still remains markedly
lower than in East and Central Europe.  Lags also cannot seemingly  account  for the large
gap.
Another line of argument that has recently gained more currency has been to
question  official estimates of  the  drop  in  output  and  hence to  lower predicted
unemployment.  According  to this view, other indicators, such as energy consumption,
suggest that output has actually declined  far less than reported. For Kazakhstan,  Russia
and Ukraine, for example,  the cumulative  drop in electricity consumption  between 1989
and 1994  was under  half the reported  decline  in GDP . This discrepancy  is largely  absent
in East and Central Europe.  Further, a growing share of output is accounted for by
unofficial activity, commonly coexisting  with activity in state or privatised firms, but
almost all of which occurs outside the trawl of the tax net. Kaufmann  and Kaliberda
(1995), for example, come up with some rough estimates indicating that by 1994 the
unofficial  economy may have accounted  for over 35 percent of aggregate  output in the
FSU and over 40 percent in both Russia and Ukraine. By contrast,  the comparable  share
for East and Central Europe  was not much above 20 percent and has actually  declined  in
EBRD, Transition report, 1995, p182
2Poland. The general conclusion is that the output drop has been far less sharp, particularly
in the FSU, and this is a factor accounting for why unemployment has remained low.
Table 1: Unemployment rates in East and Central Europe and the Former Soviet Union, 1992-95
Country  1992  1993  1994  mid-1995
East & Central Europe
Bulgaria  13.2  16.3 (21.4)  14.1(20.2)  13.0
Czech Republic  3.1  3.0 (4.1)  3.3 (4.0)  2.9
Hungary  10.7 (9.9)  12.8 (11.9)  11.3 (10.7)  10.5 (9.9)
Poland  12.9  14.9 (14.0)  16.4 (14.4)  15.0
Romania  6.2  9.2  11.0  10.3
Slovak Republic  11.3  12.9 (12.5)  14.6 (13.7)  13.8
FSU
Arnenia  0.2  5.2  6.4  5.5
Azerbaijan  0.2  0.5  0.8  0.9
Belarus  0.2  1.1  1.9  2.3
Kazakhstan  0.3  0.5  0.8  1.3
Kyrgyz Republic  0.1  0.2  0.4  1.3
Russia  0.4 (4.8)  1.0 (5.6)  1.7 (7.1)  2.7 (7.7)
Ukraine  0.3  0.4  0.4  0.4
Uzbekhistan  0.1  0.2  0.2  0.5
Note: The numbers are from registrations data. Figures in brackets are LFS numbers
Source: OECD and World Bank
.However,  while this  highlights the  importance of  compensating output growth
from  sources other than the originally dominant  state or privatised  firms,  it does not
undermine  the argument that output in the  state or privatised  sector has declined very
significantly. As such, we still have to explain the discrepancies highlighted by Table 2.
This  shows  that  compared  with  East  and  Central  Europe,  changes  in  industrial
employment relative to output since 1990 have run in opposite directions.  In the former,
employment has commonly adjusted faster than output. By contrast in the FSU there has
3been a very substantial increase in employment given output. Firms facing large negative
product market  shocks and disruptions have tended to go slow on their adjustments to
2 employment, with obvious consequences, as noted, for unemployment  . What the table
omits,  however, is that firms  in the FSU  have commonly  reduced working hours and
hence effective wages to those employed. Much of the offset to this income decline has
been provided by unofficial activity. Workers have thus combined continuing attachment
to  state firms  with  growing involvement in  informal  activity.  Rather than generating
open unemployment, available evidence points to significant under-employment in state
and  privatised  firms alongside widespread participation  in informal private activity by
workers.
Table  2: Change  in employment  relative  to output in transition  economies:  1990-1994
East and Central  Europe  FSU
Bulgaria  - 5.5  Arrnenia  +47.8
Czech Republic  +16.1  Azerbaijan  +37.5
Hungary  -12.8  Belarus  +23.9
Poland  -24.5  Kazakhstan  +51.9
Romania  +20.1  Kyrgyz  Rep  +88.4
Slovak  Republic  +11.4  Russia  +62.7
Ukraine  +36.6
Uzbekhistan  - 6.1
Source:  OECD,  Short  Term  Economic  Indicators,  Paris, 1995
This paper is an attempt to explain why FSU -- and, most particularly, Russian --
employment  in state and privatised firms has not  only  stayed high and unemployment
low, but has also been accompanied by a very swift growth in the informal or unofficial
economy. We trace this development through to a combination of factors that include the
control regime of state and privatised firms, the composition of worker compensation and
the nature of subsidies or financial supports that firms  continue to receive. Through a
combination  of  the  inheritance  and  the  structure  of  financial  transfers,  firms  have
remained  the  primary  sites  of  social  protection.  We  show  that  subsidies for  social
benefits have, in  effect, been a  subsidy to employment  and have promoted continuing
2 Commander,  Dhar and  Yemtsov  (1995)
4attachment  of workers  to these firms. Partly because of the continuing  flow of subsidies,
partly because of the internal control structure  of firms, labour shedding has been held
back.  With firms  commonly working at  low  capacity, workers have often taken
significant  cuts in hours and in monetary  compensation,  including  through  wage arrears.
Such adjustments have not excluded continuing access to social benefits or the non-
monetary component  of compensation.  But they have motivated workers to search for
further sources  of monetary  income.  The result has been continuing  attachment  alongside
significant  moonlighting  or involvement  in the informal  economy.
Later we  formalise this  argument in  a  two  sector model and  look at  the
implications for labour allocation. Having done this, we then proceed to analyse the
outcomes associated  with a change in ownership,  or, more exactly, an explicit insider
privatisation,  of the type that has dominated  in Russia  3.  We show  that insider  dominated
firms will tend to respond  to a loss of subsidy for benefits by reducing  employment  and
benefits and, under certain  assumptions,  will also tend to separate  those divisions  within
the firm that have historically  provided  benefits.
Control, benevolence and soft budgets
Having indicated  these particular  features  of the transition  in the FSU, the obvious
question  to ask is why have they arisen and can they be expected to persist ?  To answer
this, we must necessarily  start  with the reasons for state and privatised  firms  continuing  to
keep employment  high. One common  view has been to emphasize  the control structure  of
the characteristic  FSU  firm and, in particular,  the evidence  that, despite  formal  changes  in
control regimes, firms and their controlling  agents continue to place a high weight on
objectives  that are a good deal broader  than profit maximization.  Firms behave  as if they
have  important social responsibilities which cause them  to  act with  benevolence.
Privatisation has as yet failed to snap this behaviour. As such, we can think of these
economies  characterised  by combinations  of state-owned  and privatised  firms with both
being dominated  by insiders.  In the former  case,  this indicates  the effective  loss of control
by the state and in the latter, the nature  of the privatisation  process  that has occured  4. As
Estrin, Earle and Leshchenko (1995) and Boycko et al (1995)
See, for example, Boycko et al (1995)
5regards the nature  of this insider  control,  while there is evidence  that managers  may  have
acquired  considerable  discretion  in decision-making,  in terms of employment  setting  this
discretion is  severely qualified by  the  observed reluctance to  impose involuntary
separations  on workers. While this reluctance  may clearly reflect a variety of pressures,
the need to maintain worker cooperation,  possibly to repel outsider interest,  may have
been a factor behind  this outcome.
Another key difference from East and  Central Europe --  and one that may
ultimately explain a  significant part of  this  apparent benevolence -- has been the
continuing flow of subsidies to firms. Table 3 indicates that in Russia, Ukraine and
Kazakhstan transfers to the firm sector have stayed high, albeit on a declining  trend.
Moreover, these figures are likely to be severe under-estimates  as they do not capture
many of the transfers from local government to  firms -- an increasingly important
phenomenon  -- not to speak  of the widespread  non-compliance  in tax obligations  by state
and privatised firms and implicit  subsidization  through arrears. Evidence  unequivocally
shows that a significant  share of the firm sector continues  to operate under soft budget
constraints,  with that softness  originating  not only from the various levels  of government,
public utilities and the tax administration,  but also from the financial  system . As such,
the pressure  to release labour  coming from the budget  constraint  has been weaker  than in
East and Central Europe.
While the  budget constraint is  an  important part of  the  story as  to  why
unemployment  in the FSU remains  low, it is only a part of the story. And it is incomplete
without thinking more specifically  about the reasons for why workers  choose to stay in
state and privatised  firms,  as also why firms allow those workers  to stay in, despite  major
and not easily reversible  shocks  to demand  for their products.
'See  Alfandari  et al (1995)
6Table  3: Subsidies  to enterprises,  1992 - 1995 (% of GDP)
Country  1992  1993  1994  1995
Kazakhstan  2.5  6.8  5.5  4.3e
Russia  31.6  8.6  4.9  l
Ukraine  12.8  16.4  17.0  6.Oe
Source:  World  Bank
Benefits  and  compensation
One  important  inheritance  of  the  Soviet  system  was  that  firms  commonly
provided  a wide  range  of  social  benefits,  including  housing,  child  and  health  care,  to  their
workers.  This  was  particularly  true  in  the  larger  firms,  as  measured  by  employment,  and
6
ensured  that  access  to  benefits  was  explicitly  linked  to  the  site  of  employment  . Indeed,
the  planners  had  aimed  to  raise  attachment  and  lower  turnover  precisely  by  the  use  of
such  firm-specific  components  of  compensation.  Associated  to  this  was  a  relatively  low
monetary  wage.  Survey  evidence  suggests  that  in  1992/93  benefits  comprised  roughly  30
percent  of  total  labour  costs  in  Russia  '.  At  the  same  time,  enterprise  spending  on  social
assets  was  reported  in the  range  of  4 percent  of  GDP.
In  both  scope  and  scale  of  benefits  provision,  it  is  clear  that  since  the  start  of
transition  changes  have  been  relatively  limited.  Firms  in  both  Ukraine  and  Russia  have
continued  to offer  roughly  the  same  menu  of  benefits  to  their  workers  even  when  this  has
8
imposed  a  financial  burden  on  the  firm  . But  it  is  also  evident  that  many  firms  --
particularly  the  larger  firms  -- have  received  compensating  finance  for  benefits  provision
from  various  levels  of  government.  Le  Houerou  (1995)  points  out  that  regional  and  local
governnents  tend  to  subsidise  or  extend  ad  hoc  tax  exemptions  to  firms  that  maintain
large  stocks  of  social  assets.  As  housing  divestiture  to  municipalities  has  been  mandated
in  Russia,  it is revealing  that  explicit  housing  subsidies  in  1995  were  around  4 percent  of
GDP.  In  other  states  of  the  FSU,  housing  still  remains  largely  on  the  books  of  firms  and
6 An empirical overview is provided in Commander, Lee and Tolstopiatenko (1995)
7Commander,  Liberman and Yemtsov (1993)
Commander and Schankerman (1995)
7with fixed utility prices and low cost recovery could be expected to impose a major
burden on firms and/or government,  depending  on the degree  of subsidy.
In sum, firms  throughout  the FSU provided many functions  that would commonly
be the responsibility  of local governments  in OECD settings.  Workers  had access  to such
benefits -- including merit goods, like health and child care -- through the firm. There was
little cost recovery  but workers  received  a low level of monetary  compensation.  The costs
of  benefits provision to the firm were commonly  offset by subsidy from government.
This financing  regime  has continued  into the transition.
Compensation and labour allocation
We now try and think through in a more formal way the implications for labour
allocation  in an economy where the state and/or privatised  sector provides its workers
with  benefits  and  hence  with  a  mixed  compensation  package.  We characterise  the
economy in terrns of two sectors. One comprises benefits-providing firms and the other,
which may or may not provide benefits, consists of de novo private firms.  Workers in the
state or privatised sector can allocate their effort exclusively to that sector or allocate their
effort across both sectors. For workers in the state sector to retain attachment and ensure
access to social benefits they must however give a minimum effort level.
The state sector
The state sector is dominated by insiders. Such firms are not constrained by their
labour  demand  curves  but  set  wages  and  employment  consistent  with  their  average
product curves. This gives the sector some of the characteristics of the worker managed
firm.  Because multiple job  holding is feasible,  insiders'  utility can most generally be
written as;
U(N, w) = NSS(u(ws +b 5 +pS)-v(e))+NsP(u(ws  +bP +wP)-v(e'  +eP))+
+(Ms  - NS  - N 5P)u(x)
Where NS=NS+NP  is employment in the state sector. N'  workers only have a job in the
state sector, working with effort, e
5 and getting compensated, ws+bs+  p3 where, wS  =the
cash wage; bS  = the value of social benefits per worker provided by the state firm and,
p`=ks(es- es&)  or premium over the minimum effort required to stay attached. NP workers
8have a primary  job in state sector  giving effort, e5 0 and getting  compensated,  w%+b'.  They
also have  a secondary  job in the de novo  private sector, giving  effort e'O  and getting  paid
w'.  A'=  M+N"'+LV gives  the number  of those who seek work in the state sector.
With Cobb-Douglas  technology  in the state sector,
YS = F(N')  = (N')1,  where 0 <  <1 and
weighted  employment  is; N'  = e'N'  +  e'NP
The constraint  is given  by zero  profits;
=pF(Ns).-w!N'  - wPNP  =  O,  where
w  =(w'  +p')+b'; and  w"P  = wi'  +b' <  w5  where  e'  is  the  minimum effort  for
retaining access to benefits and p'  =  XS  (es  - eo) is thus the additional  wage for those
who work only in the state sector.
We can now solve the insider's problem, considering  N'  and N'P as the only
endogenous variables. With some manipulation  and denoting X as the marginal rate of
substitution  between workers  with one and two  jobs or as a ratio of net utilities  (benefits)
of one and two  jobs;
u(w'  +  b' + wP)  - v(eO + eP)  - u(x) 2
u(w' +  b' +  ps)  -v(e') - u(x)
eos <1 - ￿ 
w55
we find the ratio of workers  with one and two  jobs,
N5  y P(X-')-ry'N(X-y)
We can readily see that the increase  in utility associated  with a higher wage  must at least
compensate  the disutility  associated  with the greater  effort required  when working  in both
sectors simultaneously.  In other words,  if the return to effort in the state sector  is small --
Xs  <  pF' and p' <  wV  -- then all who can find a secondary  job in the private sector will
take it and we will have  a corner  solution.
9We have an interior  solution  if the following  conditions ,hold;
i)  x>  >W
ii)  O<Yr,  X-Y  <x<  x-r  <I
X-v  X-v
Condition (i) means that the ratio of the net benefit of one and two jobs must be more
than the ratio of  the costs, which must be more than the ratio of their efforts. The last
inequality simply means that remuneration  for additional effort pS  =  X (e5  - e')  in the
state sector  must satisfy  the condition  (if taxes and subsidies  are absent):
C'  eS  >  pS  =  ;,S(eS  _  eO)  <  C  (eS  _  eO5), =t  x  <  eS
c  +peo
Condition (ii)  simply restricts the  range  of  values for the  elasticity of  output to
employment  from the production  function  for the existence  of an interior  solution.
Having  found 0 , we can determine  the supply  of moonlight  workers;
0  N'  with an interior solution NP=  11+0  wta
NS  with a corner  solution
where employment  in the state  sector  Ns satisfies  the condition
p>F(5N`)  = Nswss  I +ro
1+0
and where we introduced  the effort function;
-s  es  +Oe'0
1+0
Having determined  the supply  of moonlight  labour,  we now turn to the demand  side and
look at the de novo private  sector.
The de novo private sector
The private sector's technology  is given by a CES function with an elasticity  of
substitution, e=  + 1 ,  between two types of  labor (,=1)  or  between the products
generated by  full  time  and  moonlight workers  allocating different efforts (P<1).
Accordingly,  with this function  the de novo firm's maximization  problem  is;
10p=p(a(ePNPP)  PP+(l-a)(ePNPP)XP)  P-(WPP+raP)NPP  - wP'NP'  =*max,
The term,  rae,  gives any start-up costs associated with the provision of social benefits
that might  face de  novo firms.  We can imagine that  such  costs might be  non-trivial
particularly in a context where there is a poorly functioning real estate market.
The first order conditions for the maximization problem are;
pF'(-)ax(eP)'"(NPP)-PP=-  wPP +raP
pF'(.)a(eP)-P(NPs)-PP-'  wPs
With the CES fumction,  we get the allocation of employment, as follows;
P(E-1)  E
NAs  1l-cc  wP+pP+bP+ra  0D0ID)E
N PP  te)  (  a  WP)
Obviously,  the  number  of  workers  of  each  type  is  determined  by  the  ratio  of
compensation to effort (when s > 1). The degree of such dependence is proportional to
the  elasticity of  substitution. If the elasticity  of  substitution  is equal to  1 there is no
explicit dependence in the allocation of employment on the ratio of efforts (although there
exists  an  implicit  dependence  on  effort  through  the  coefficients  a  and  1-a).  The
sensitivity in the allocation of labour to differences in wages, benefits, start-up costs and
effort increases in step with the elasticity of substitution between the two types of labour.
We should also notice that we have an implicit  constraint  on the number of full time
workers which should be at least greater than, or equal to, one. A smaller value for the
number of full time  workers implies a  corner solution.  These are possible  under two
scenarios. The first arises if the effort exerted by full time workers is much greater than
the eff6rt exerted by part-time workers and the second if the start-up costs associated with
providing social benefits are large.
Withdrawing subsidies: effects on compensation and employment
We have indicated that in a system where workers in state or privatised firms get
compensated with a mix of cash wages and benefits and where outside provision of such
benefits is restricted or where potential providers face large start-up costs, there will be a
strong  tendency  for  de  novo  firms  to  rely  on  part-time  labour  and  hence  for
11informalization. This can obviously only occur because of the control structure of state
firms which sanctions labour hoarding. We have made the assumption that state firms are
prepared  to  continue  financing  benefits  provision.  Given  the  fact  that  firms  have
commonly  been  able to extract subsidies to  maintain  provision,  this  is not altogether
surprising.  We now look more closely at the  likely decisions that a benefits-providing
firm  will  take  in  the event  of  a  contraction  in  subsidies  and hence  a  change in  the
financing  regime.  We do this  in  two steps;  the first  does the comparative statics; the
second  goes a bit  further in stylising the structure  of  the firm and the  impact of the
withdrawal of subsidy 9.
Case with exogenous benefits
The representative firm is assumed to maximize the utility of the insiders;
U = N(w+b-x),
where w is monetary wage and b is benefits, x is the outside opportunity,
under a zero profit constraint,
71, = pY(t)-(w+b(l-s))N=O
where s is the subsidy related to benefits provision.
In the first instance, we again assume Cobb-Douglas technology;
Y = F(N) = (N)5, where 0 < ,  < 1
From the zero profit constraint we find
c = w +  b =  p  + sb
N
and substituting into the utility function we get;
U = N(w + b - x) = N(PK  + sb - x) = pY - N(x  - sb)
N
Subsidies, sb, and hence benefits, b, are exogenously given.
The first order condition is
x-sb=pY'=  PY
N
Combining it with the constraint we get compensation;
9 This section draws on and extends the analysis in Commander and Schankerman (1995).
12pY
c=  w+b=  - +sb  = P-'x-(l-[)[-'sb
and from
PN  ,-'x  - 0 -'sb
N
we get employment,
N =(  > No =(p  where  No is the case of no subsidies.
We can see that with subsidies,  employment  is clearly  larger and compensation  is smaller
than in  the case without subsidies. This is because they influence employment and
compensation  through the utility maximization  and the constraint.  Subsidies  shift up the
average product curve and allow for larger employment  and/or compensation.  But they
also shift the relationship  between inside and outside opportunities  (x to x-sb) which will
increase  employment.  Given the production  function and the fact that ,  < 1, this channel
acts  more  strongly on  compensation resulting in  lower  compensation and  larger
employment  than in the case without  subsidies.
Let us see what will happen  if subsidies  are cut. Employment  will decrease  and
compensation  (and wages  if social benefits are fixed) will increase  in the short run. If we
introduce a demand shock also (p(t) < p(O)) we will have the same increase in total
compensation and  a  larger decrease in  employment. Therefore, a  demand shock
influences  employment  only and leads  to its further  decline.
We should  emphasize  that all conclusions  concerning  the dependence  of wages  on
subsidies are closely related  to the assumption  of Cobb-Douglas  technology  in the state
sector with an elasticity of output with respect to employment of less than one. If we
assume another form of production function, for instance, with  linear average and
marginal products;
Y = N(Tj- aN)
where rl = maximum  of average  product  and a = the slope of the average  product  curve,
we get another  solution  of the maximization  problem
13p'r-x+sb  C=p+x+sb.  w=c-b
2pa  2-  2
In this case we have the same decline in employment  when cutting subsidies,  but
we now also get a decline  in compensation  and wages when cutting subsidies.  Therefore,
we can see that the direction  of change in wages when cutting subsidies  depends  on the
choice of technology in the state sector. To see the conditions determining  the sign of
dependence of  wages and compensation on subsidies, note that in  general we find
employment  from the equation
x - sb =  pY'
and diminishing returns (Y" < 0)  guarantees a positive dependence  of employment  on
subsidies.  To find compensation  we use the equation;
C= w+ b = pY +sb=  x -sb(I-EN(y))
N  EN (Y)
If the elasticity  of output  with respect to employment  is constant and less than one -- the
case with Cobb-Douglas  technology  -- we have a negative dependence  of compensation
and wages on subsidies.  If the elasticity of output with respect to employment  is greater
than one we find a positive relationship  between compensation  and subsidies.  If the
elasticity  of output  with respect  to employment  is not a constant  the condition  of negative
dependence  of compensation  on subsidies  takes the form
Y"_  MP'
_  <1
(Y I N)'  AP'
and it follows from the equation  that,
ac  aAPaN  aAP  aMP =1+  =1-  I
asb  aN  aN
It is easy to check that this second case of technology  does not satisfy  this condition  and
we have a positive dependence  of compensation  and wages on subsidies.
Case with endogenous benefits
In all the cases discussed above we could not say anyting  about how benefits
change when cutting subsidies  because we considered  them as exogenous  and looked at
changes  in total compensation  only.  In the case of wages,  we assumed  that benefits were
14fixed. To separate  out the consequences  for both wages and benefits  we must endogenize
benefits. For this purpose we can also slightly change our set-up, supposing  that wages
and benefits are not perfect substitutes. Assuming for simplicity a  separable utility
function;
u(w,b,x)  = a,  ln(w) + a,b  ln(b)  - cax  ln(x)
we can rewrite  the utility  of workers  in the form
U = N(u(w)  + u(b) - u(x))
In this case we can find the maximum  of utility over the set of three variables  (N, w, b) (if
s<l). The first order  conditions  for the case s < 1 will be:
MRS.b  - - dw = u(b)  = 1- s(t)
MRSb~~dbu'(w)
u(w) + u(b) - u(x) = (1-  EN (Y))u'(w)(w + (1 - s)b)
which we must solve  together  with the zero profit constraint
pY-(w+b(I  -s))N  = 0
In the case of the simple utility function written above in logarithmic  form and Cobb-
Douglas technology  (1 <  1)  we get from the first order conditions;
w  a - (1 - s(t))b
Cab
N =  (  CbP  1
((Xb  + CC)(l  - s)bJ
a,  (~~~~~~,
(a  '  (1s) b =  eI1 3x  aj,  I\  a~bJba
Substituting  b into w  and N,
ab
w= a.  _s(t))b=el  abah 
(  XbP  ) '  I  a wP  CCb  (  ab  )ab+a.  1-P
(ab  +aW)(l-s)b)  (ab  +cx  a)e'-Pxa+a.
15When cutting subsidies, we now get a decrease in benefits, an increase in wages and a
decrease in employment. Therefore, the only qualitative difference with the previous set-
up with risk-neutral individuals and exogenous benefits is that wages and benefits move
in opposite directions when cutting subsidies on benefits. At the same time the elasticities
of wages  and employment with respect to  subsidies will depend on the preferences of
workers (ab/aW),  as well as on the elasticity of output P3.
If we reject the assumption of Cobb-Douglas technology  in the state sector and
again use a technology with linear average product we cannot find explicit expressions
for wages, benefits and employment but we can find relationships for these quantities;
N=  _a  W+ab  w
a  awa
(a,  +ab)(l+lnw)---w-  =a,,  lnx+ab  lnQ  s))
w  CCb
_x_.(I  - )b  CCbT1
(X w  +b  + cc  lnktb(  ) )  (I  1-s)b  = (xxlnx-ablnb
It follows that employment and benefits are again positive functions of subsidies; wages
again negatively  depend on subsidies in contrast  to the case of perfect  substitutability
between wages  and benefits. We can also derive  a general  condition  for the negative
dependence of wages on benefits which takes the form;
MP  IMP'r
AP  AP'
it follows from the equation that,
a w  a MP  8 AP  MP]  a wb
as  aN  AN  AP  CC,,  +ab
It can be easily seen that both examples of technology satisfy this condition.
Withdrawing subsidies and the structure of the firm
We now look at the implications of a subsidy withdrawal on the structure of the
firm. We assume that, as before, the firm is insider dominated and that the firm will not
be constrained by the labour demand curve but by the average product curve. We further
stylise the firm as having two Divisions; Division  1 produces goods; Division 2 provides
16benefits. Figure 1 provides a simple flow diagram putting together the respective  costs
and revenues  of these two parts of the firm, where  rkNI,  and rkN 2 are the opportunity  costs
of not renting or not selling  the firm's social assets and included  in the value of benefits,
bi = bi?  + rk.
Figure 1
pY  subs,  FIRM
.bINI  IwN,+ bINI
. +  Div  b1N 1 N1 workers  |
. | rk~~~~~~N  XK  rkN2|'
W 2N2+  b2 N2~
Div  II  wre
. . . . . . . ..........................
subs 2 K=kN=k(N 1 +N 2 )
As before, we let both divisions work under a zero profit constraint;
x,  = pY+ subs, -w,NN,-b,N,  =0
7t  2 = b 1N, + b2N2 + subs2 - w 2N2 - b2N2 =  0
which if only benefits are subsidised takes the form;
7rI  =pY-w 1 N,  -(l-s)b 1 N1 = 0
,2 = bpN, +b 2N 2 - w 2N 2 -(l-s)b 2 N 2 = 0
From the last equation we can find the cost of providing benefits for Division 1,
b1N1 =w 2N2 - sb2 N2
which obviously decreases with increasing subsidies.
To get the allocation of employment between these two divisions, let us assume
that the utility of only workers in Division 1 is maximized. We also assume that workers
in Division 1 can make and enforce their decisions due to the fact that N1 > N2. In other
words, majoritarian decisions are binding.
We accordingly write;
Ul = N, (u(wl) + u(bl) - u(x)) -+ max
17Again  we think of the firm continuing  to operate under a zero profit  constraint
7,  = pY-  wIN, - (1- s)bN, =  0
E2 =bN 1 +sbN 2 -w2N2 =0
Assuming  for simplicity  that benefits  per worker are the same  in both sectors,  that is;
b,= b 2 = b and assuming  Cobb-Douglas  technology  for Division 1 we have;
Y  F(N,) = (N,)  where 0 < ,  <  1
We can now find benefits,  wages  and employment  in Division 1 in the same way as we
did above. Substituting  them into the expression  for employment  in Division  2, which  we
get from the second  profit constraint,  we obtain;
N2 =  abp  NP(s)
(a  b  + a w)(I  - s)  W2 - sb(s)
or
'-P  a  (wls)iJ
N  abP  (oLb  +a  )e  0  (OxQ)a+,
(ab  +a.)('  2 -)  (  +a,
'.Jt-se  ~(ab  +a.)x3f  a,ls))
As employment  in Division  1 and benefits  per worker are positively  related  to subsidies,
we get a decrease  in employment  in Division  2 when cutting subsidies  to social benefits,
assuming the wage in Division 2 to be fixed. The implication is that faced with a
withdrawal  of subsidy,  a two-part  firm dominated  by workers  in one of the two Divisions
--  in  this  case, the producers --  will tend  to  scale  back employment  in the  benefits-
providing  part of the firm. Given  what we know from our earlier exercise,  the result will
tend to be loss of benefits  provision  in the hard budget  constrained  firm.
Conclusion
A feature  of the transition  in  much  of the  FSU  has been the  relatively small
amount of unemployment that has been generated. In contrast to East and Central Europe,
employment in state and privatised firms has stayed high. Although there has been some
labour shedding, hoarding has remained significant. At the same time, the de novo private
18sector's  growth though far from trivial has been quite distinct from Eastern Europe. In the
latter,  de  novo  firms  appeared  early  in  the  transition,  initially  in  services,  and  then
expanded into other sectors. While there has ben significant tax evasion by de novo firms,
they have mostly been distinct economic entitities. By contrast, in the FSU de novo firms
have tended to be closely linked to existing state or privatised  firms and to have been
widely dependent on part-time, informal labour.
These  differences  can  be  attributed  to  a  variety  of  factors,  not  least  the
continuation of soft budget constraints. But there are several specific features that have
exacerbated this outcome. Primary among these has been the legacy of social protection
in  the  firm and the associated  structure of  compensation.  Workers have continued to
receive  a  significant share  of compensation  in  non-monetary  form and  this  share has
tended to increase through the transition.  Instead of laying off workers, firms have cut
hours  and  wages  but  have  proven  remarkably  averse  to  outright  separations.  This
probably reflects the structure of internal control and the coalitions that have been formed
among insiders. It can also be traced to pressures from government -- local and federal --
on firms to limit the flow of workers into unemployment.
Given this structure of control by insiders, we have concentrated on the resulting
incentives for workers to maintain attachment to  state or  privatised  firms and for the
associated informalisation of de novo private  employment.  With benefits and benefits
financing associated to state and privatised firms, we found that there would be a strong
incentive  for workers  to  stay  in  those  firms  but  allocate  their  effort in part-time  or
moonlighting activity in the de novo private sector. This result is, of course, emphasized
when benefits provision is a source of subsidy.
We  then  go  on  to  look  at  the  implications  of  a  loss  of  subsidy  for  the
compensation  and  employment decisions of  insider dominated firms.  We show  that,
under  certain  conditions, such  firms will  tend  to  scale  down  benefits  provision  and
employment.  Extending this  further to the case of a firm with two divisions; one that
produces, one that provides benefits, we see that workers in the dominant division -- the
producing  one  -- will tend to  close down the  benefits  providing division if  a  simple
majoritarian decision rule is assumed. This raises  some important issues relating to the
19maintenance of an optimal supply of benefits that we do not deal with here. Rather, our
focus has been on trying to explain the factors behind the low, open unemployment, high
informalisation that is so very clearly a feature of the FSU economies.
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